It is a commonplace of both political and academic argument that the last quarter of twentieth century saw major diminution of national economic policy autonomy, with increased capital mobility identified as the key explanatory variable. Despite such qualification regarding capital mobility impact, the idea of 1970s as a watershed for national policy autonomy is still pervasive. 9 This article looks at how that credibility is constructed in the contemporary period (1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003), and goes on to analyse the degree of enduring fiscal policy autonomy in two cases -Britain and 
ontology of neorealism'. 30 These scholars see international capital mobility as purely exogenous constraint on states conceived as unitary actors with fixed preferences. 31 Sinclair argues convincingly that 'Linear structural models of cause and effect extensive latitude to governments in how they deliver on these indictors, and furthermore to pursue policies which do not adversely effect the key indicators. 37 Inflation is a pressing concern, and to a lesser extent budget deficits, although 'the influence of financial markets on government policy is much stronger on the monetary policy side than on the fiscal policy side'. 38 Little else is affording significant attention, and quantitative analysis unearthed a surprisingly small impact on risk premia of sizeable shifts in budget balance.
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The
Contemporary IPE and The Institutional Context of Policy Autonomy
This more fine-grained analysis of how capital mobility operates, its interaction with states and domestic policy actors, and what institutions shape its impact, is necessary to unearth how financial credibility is constructed. The following sections briefly establish key elements of the ideational and institutional context within which fiscal policy rectitude is constructed for advanced economies.
The IMF
In the period between the foundation of the IMF and the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s, the financial credibility of national governments was closely tied to the role of the IMF. As scale of private lending activity increased, and the role of private credit-creating bodies has expanded, 40 this has become much less true. The IMF continues to perform the surveillance function laid down in the 1978 rewriting of Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, gathering large amounts of data and regularly publishing its opinion of the economic policy rectitude of governments. This remains a significant contributory factor to the intellectual climate of opinion, but in the absence of the leverage it enjoyed as a lender, IMF influence on economic policymaking within advanced capitalist democracies is greatly reduced.
The economic context of the climate of opinion has seen some quite dramatic shifts in very recent times. For the last three decades of the twentieth century fears of inflation dominated financial markets and much government economic thinking. Such fears formed a crucial element of the context in which economic policy was discussed.
By 2002 concerns about deflation, especially in Japan and China, led to the setting-up of an IMF task force. 41 This stressed the conjunction of declines in global equity markets, excess capacity in many industries, slow economic recovery, geopolitical uncertainties and higher oil prices as evidence of how deflationary pressures might emerge. Whilst noting that the danger of a global deflation was small, nevertheless, the IMF warned of the potential difficulties of a falling price level, the need to prevent any such deflation before it occurred, and the desirability of constructing unorthodox policy responses if the threat strengthened. Although the deflationary threat has abated, very low inflation itself involves a strikingly different economic environment from that prevailing since the 1970s, not least because of the associated very low interest rates. Such rates mean that government debt burdens are much reduced, and worries about fiscal unsustainability, so prevalent up to the 1990s, no longer look plausible. In turn, much of the edifice set up to constrain fiscal 'irresponsibility' of national governments seems anachronistic. This highlights the contingency and context-specificity of financial credibility which is much underplayed in many accounts focusing on neo-liberal policy constraints 'imposed' by financial markets.
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Bond Rating Agencies
In the wake of the internationalisation of capital markets in the contemporary period, as the scale of private lending activity increased, 43 the views of the major bond rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poors, on the creditworthiness of governments became much more significant as capital markets grew more important as sources of financing relative to traditional bank loans. 44 These agencies, in rating sovereign bonds, became an important indicator of the credibility of government economic policies, and play a key role in inducing confidence regarding borrowing governments in these disintermediated international capital markets. 
Financial Credibility and the Stability and Growth Pact
For members of the Eurozone the SGP involves legally enforceable constraints on fiscal policies, which largely supplant the constraints maintained by financial markets and international financial organisations in the previous decades. The very existence of the SGP reflects worries that within monetary union individual national governments would face looser constraints, potentially leading to spillover effects from national policies to the wider Eurozone. 53 How far this has a significant impact on national governments depends both on the rules of the SGP and the extent to which governments are persuaded/coerced into compliance.
To limit 'bad behaviour' by national governments the EU pursued a number of policies. One was to legislate a 'no bail-out' rule, so that financial institutions lending to individual governments would not be misled into believing that such lending would be guaranteed by the Union as a whole. Second, there are limits on bank holding of government debt to prevent excessive monetising of the debt and the risk that excessive borrowing could threaten the stability of financial institutions. 54 Finally, there is the SGP with its rules about the fiscal policies of individual governments, backed by sanctions. 55 The SGP, agreed after fraught political negotiation, reflected the German-led insistence on a tough regime, so that in addition to a re-assertion of the 3 per cent and 60 per cent ceilings, a medium-term aim of a budget 'close to balance or in surplus' was inserted. As part of the Pact governments have to submit an annual stability programme. Only in exceptional circumstances (defined in terms of depth of a recession) will deficits be allowed to exceed 3 per cent.
Deficits fell most sharply in the run-up to 1999, and signalled the political commitment of governments to accept the very rough and ready targets of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP and bear this cost of the Euro. The recent arguments about the crudity of the SGP should not blind us to the fact that fiscal discipline was asserted very successfully in the 1990s, and in that context current differences appear so far at least quite marginal. 56 While almost all commentators have accepted the need for fiscal discipline, some questioned the desirability of any rules at all, while others questioned the particular rules applied. Although Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty specified analysis of the role of public investment within the deficit, and the taking into account of the economic cycle, and the medium term budgetary position, these precisions have been largely forgotten. 57 The crude deficit rule made no allowance for the state of the economic cycle, nor the fact that most countries started with significant structural deficits (i.e. deficits not caused by the cycle). The debt rule did not address under what conditions debt becomes unsustainable. 58 In fact the deficit rule would not be very restrictive in the medium term if we make a simple comparison with long-run fiscal policy. 59 Only rarely have governments run deficits of more than 3 per centsuggesting such a rule does not involve a tightening of rules enforced by previous institutional arrangements, though changing underlying conditions make such comparisons complex. 60 Had the Euro had been launched at a time when structural budgets were in balance, or had a period of faster growth preceded the 2002 slowdown, the 3 per cent rule would probably not have caused difficulties.
Slow growth of the Euro area since 2001, exacerbated by the slow response of the ECB to the slowdown, forced fiscal policy into a more expansionary form. 61 The ECB's policy record has been unaccommodating, and betrays its excessively inflation-oriented agenda, reflecting the sound money and finance agenda instilled in the foundations and architecture of EMU, 62 despite the brief emergence of deflationary fears detailed above. 63 In 2002 
French Fiscal policy
Increasing financial liberalization and deregulation facilitating capital mobility allegedly leads Governments to eschew expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in favour of tight money and balanced budgets. 66 Yet the degree of constraint and starkness of policy trade-offs posited by CMH scholarship outlined above are difficult to reconcile with the recent history of French fiscal policymaking.
In the early 1990s, as recession took hold, Bérégovoy's Government pursued a bold, countercyclical, expansionary fiscal policy in 1992, justified in Keynesian terms of the need to counter the demand squeeze. This must also be situated in its appropriate electoral context. The Socialist Government was trying, unsuccessfully, to stave of a crushing defeat, punishment for its having overseen inexorably rising unemployment, and a growth in inequality, in the post-1983 U-turn period. 67 This countercyclical fiscal stimulus, in combination with a deepening recession, led to a decisive breaching of the Maastricht 3 per cent public deficit criteria. Peaking at 5.6
per cent in 1993, France remained in breach until 1998. 68 As slow growth, compounded by the need to steer a path consistent with the Maastricht convergence criteria continued to exert pressure on the public finances, fiscal policy became more restrictive. The public deficit was progressively reduced, between 1995 and 1997 as the 3 per cent reference value for the budget deficit became a key policy concern.
Austerity measures and fiscal tightening brought the deficit down, according to official figures, to 3.1 per cent in 1997. 69 Meeting, or just missing (depending on which figures you trust), the 3 per cent reference target in time for accession to EMU involved some creative accounting.
This illustrates the socially mediated nature of economic credibility, and the role that From 1999 onwards, public spending accelerated and budgets became more redistributive. 71 This, combined with redistribution to lower income brackets with a higher propensity to spend, kept demand buoyant during the growth period.
Purchasing power as a proportion of household revenue increased by 16 per cent between 1997 and 2002 (the largest 5 year increase in over 20 years). 72 There has been continuity in the role and importance of automatic stabilizers within the French fiscal policy framework, though both the recession of the early 1990s, and the downturn which followed a decade later.
The considerable degree of policy autonomy in both decisions appears considerable and gives the lie to the supposed tight constraints in the context of capital mobility.
Indeed, the critique of the SGP that it takes no account of the economic cycle is double-edged. Some point to a lack of symmetry in the SGP arrangements which leave governments excessively unconstrained during economic upswings. 73 In 2000, the Jospin government embarked on the biggest tax cut in 20 years. 74 Given the subsequent worsening of the economic climate and the public finances between 2001
and 2003, many retrospectively criticised the Jospin government for being excessively profligate with its cagnotte (tax windfall), using it to cut taxes rather than repay more debt.
The Jospin Government reduced its debt burden due to lower interest rates, not debt reduction. Indeed, debt levels were rising in this period. In the last decade, although were sharply expansionary, as spending increased by almost 3 per cent in volume, and taxes were significantly reduced. 84 The more expansionary fiscal policy pursued in
France, and its impact on internal demand, in part explains the hitherto superior growth performance of France compared to the Eurozone as a whole -in both upswing and downswing phases.
Whilst on the spending side, the electoral cycle doubtless provided some impetus for the expansion, its impact has been still more dramatic on the receipts side. Many saw the Jospin Government's tax cuts outlined above as an electoralist stunt, driven at least in part by a partially populist logic, given the 'war chest' provided by economic growth, and the proximity of decisive elections. 85 That said, the shift to a more restrictive path (a shift further emphasised in the wake of European disputes in late 2003), was in part a reflection of a concern to keep within striking distance of SGP reference points.
France's more austerity-oriented fiscal policies in 2003 and 2004 (including increased social charges to more than offset tax cuts, and plans to cut certain social programmes, notably health insurance), in the context of weak growth, risks establishing vicious circle whereby, the more growth is dampened down by restrictive budgetary polices, the more austerity will be needed to tackle the public deficit and try and rein it in under 3 per cent. 93 A recent IMF report endorsed this view, warning against 'rigid adherence to annual deficit targets [which] can impart a procyclical bias to fiscal policy through contractionary measures to buttress revenues in a downswing', and has argued that binding rules which 'allow cyclical revenue fluctuations to be reflected in annual outcomes for the budget balance … would not sacrifice-and perhaps it would even enhance-policy credibility.' 94 The IMF raise long term concerns about fiscal sustainability with relation to pension and health policy reform in particular, but in the short term are content to endorse the 'full play being given to automatic fiscal stabilizers' in contributing to recovery. horribilis' of 1975/6 when the figure was 7.1 per cent. 98 Unlike in 1975/6, however, these deficits did not have disastrous effects on confidence. The initial departure from the ERM saw a substantial fall in the exchange rate, but this then stabilised until the end of 1994, to be followed by a 6 per cent fall between January and April 1995.
Similarly, widening differentials in interest rates with the US and West Germany only appeared from 1994. 99 Hence through the peak of the deficits the government was not under great pressure for their reduction. Partly this was because from 1993 the government was imposing very large tax increases to try and get the deficit down;
indeed, the two budgets of 1993 together imposed the biggest ever peacetime tax hikes in British history. But perhaps most important was the fact that inflation remained strikingly low in the early 1990s; at its lowest point it was under 2 per cent in 1993. 100 Also of help was the fact that the debt/GDP ratio, though rising, was well inside the Maastricht 60 per cent figure, running between 40-50 per cent at its peak.
The Conservative government of the mid-1990s had a proclaimed objective to eliminate public borrowing entirely, though in fact it remained in deficit until it lost office in 1997. However, there was a notable fiscal tightening in the mid-1990s, so that even allowing for the economic recovery, the fall in the PSBR was very sharp, to 1.2 per cent of GDP in 1997/8. set interest rates, on the basis of minuted discussions which after a short lag would be in the public domain. The aim of policy would be to achieve the existing target of 2.5
per cent inflation, albeit this would now be 'symmetrical' ie the figure should not be allowed substantially below nor substantially above this figure. 106 The principles of fiscal prudence were spelt out in 1998, with two key rules enunciated. 107 The first, the 'golden rule', stated that the government would, over the cycle, borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending. The second, the 'sustainable investment rule', said that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP would be held stable, and would normally be less than 40 per cent over the cycle.
These rules differed from those of the SGP. The first rule was less restrictive than the SGP's commitment to overall budgetary balance or surplus, in part because of the British backlog of public investment, which had been low since the 1970s and significantly below Eurozone levels at the turn of the century. 108 The second rule also allowed scope for some expansion of public investment as long as debt did not rise 
Rules, Credibility, and Policy Space
Thus in both our cases, in different ways, policy elites have established tough rules to build credibility, then used the policy space so created to pursue policies which might otherwise be unsustainable. New Labour's policies in power have followed the prospectus laid out by Balls in 1998: establish tough rules to build credibility, then use the policy space so created to pursue policies which might otherwise be unsustainable. 121 However it has not all gone entirely to plan. The initial fiscal prudence of 1997-9 proved more difficult to reverse than expected, so that for the whole period 1998-2002 public spending and public investment as a share of GDP were below the levels of the government's Conservative predecessor. 122 Then, when the big public spending increases did start coming through they coincided with a slowdown in the economy, so that the fiscal balance deteriorated much further than had been anticipated. In response, the government has stuck to its expansionary The virtues of sound money and sound public finances remain a priority -but they have been set in the context of other priorities, and the potential for conflicts and trade-offs between them has been recognised as has the need to allow the free play of automatic stabilizers, without straitjackets of tight, deficit rules insensitive to the economic cycle, or economic circumstances. Credibility could be retained whilst breaching (for 'sound' economic reasons given the economic conjuncture) the rules.
There was nevertheless a desire to retain the rules as reference points and medium term objectives. The shift can be explained with reference to the different ideational and political economic context in which this re-evaluation took place. The harsh fiscal consolidation in the mid 1990s was successful in achieving low interest rates and credibility in the eyes of bond and currency market operators. 
Conclusions
The CMH depicts a world of deregulated global finance and eroded autonomous fiscal 'policy space'. The empirical evidence drawn from our cases suggests that this view requires significant qualification, and that governments enjoy a good deal more fiscal policy 'wiggle room' than the CMH suggests. Our selection of the UK and French cases has illustrated the experience of both fixed and floating exchange rates.
Theoretically, very different kinds of policy autonomy should ensue. Significantly, both cases illustrate substantial degrees of policy autonomy, and offer evidence fiscal wiggle room both within and outside fixed exchange rate regimes, thus confounding
the predictions of open economy macroeconomics (assuming perfect capital mobility). These findings are based on just two cases, and the time period under consideration was, for the most part, an economic upswing. This clearly limit the generalisability of findings, but nevertheless the picture which emerges from detailed empirical analysis contrast starkly with the predictions of the Capital Mobility Hypothesis. Our evidence suggests little or no sign of significant budget deficits and expansionary fiscal policies in Britain and France incurring penalties from anxious financial market actors.
CMH scholarship tends to underplay interaction, and the ways in which a range of international and supranational institutions mediate market forces, as indeed do national political authority structures. The importance of the ideational dimension has also been insisted upon here. Economic rectitude is more politically and economically contingent than the inexorable logic of the unholy trinity suggests. In this deeply political process, actors are able to shape the room to manoeuvre to a considerable degree.
Furthermore, the recent shift to a more restrictive fiscal policy stance in France has not been driven by the inexorable logic of the unholy trinity. If the constraints do bite harder, (and the current and planned French macro policy stance suggest they may), the explanation is to be found in the political and institutional configuration of the Eurozone's institutional infrastructure and rules. Future developments depend much more on the internal politics of the Eurozone and the stand-off between Commission and member states (and more specifically on the reworking of the SGP) than on levels of international capital mobility and changes thereto.
Fiscal policy rectitude is at least in part constructed by actors (notably central bankers and Finance ministries), and not exclusively a tale of exogenous structural constraints (although these constraining material conditions clearly play their part). As a result, these goal posts can shift to some degree. The role of agency of governments, Treasuries, and financial elites within the core executive in the process of the construction of economic rectitude, and shaping the yardsticks by which their credibility levels are judged, has been illustrated with relation to the Maastricht criteria and SGP.
On a broader canvas, British and French Governments' macroeconomic strategies can be seen as powerful illustration of the continuing room for manoeuvre for national governments (even Centre-Left governments) in a world of capital mobility. As always, the size of this room is partly a matter of contingency. The not-whollyexplained continuation of world-wide low inflation has undoubtedly favoured the government's position. But a considerable part of what has occurred must be put down to a well-crafted strategy of recognising the concessions that have to be made to sustain financial credibility, while also seeing that these concessions by no means rule out the pursuit of quite traditional social democratic goals of counter-cyclical policy to achieve fuller employment and significantly higher spending on core public services.
What emerges from the preceding analysis is the context dependency of fiscal and economic policy credibility. In the contemporary context of low inflation, and low interest rates, government debt burdens are much reduced. The worries about fiscal unsustainability, so prevalent up to the 1990s, no longer look plausible. In turn, much of the edifice set up to constrain fiscal 'irresponsibility' of national governments seems anachronistic. Overall, it does not seem that SGP has made a huge difference to the capacity of national governments to conduct their own fiscal policies.
Considerable policy discretion endures, and there is little evidence of government's who exploit this policy space losing credibility with financial market actors and being punished accordingly.
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